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[COMMENTS

I

Preferential Admissions Policies And
Single-Minority Scholarships: The Legal
Implications Of Race-Preference In

Higher Education
I.

Introduction

A "minority" is defined as a "racial, religious, ethnic or political
group smaller than and differing from the larger, controlling group
in a community or nation."' Minority groups in the United States
are usually thought of as including African-Americans, Native-

Americans, Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian-Americans or any
other non-white group.' For many years such groups have received
preferential treatment in higher education admissions and scholarship programs in an effort to remedy past discrimination and to diversify the student body at many colleges and universities.' For almost as many years, these programs have been challenged by
members of the white majority.'
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d College Ed. 1984).
2. Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 382 (D.D.C. 1976).
3. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Podberesky v.
Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991); Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn.
1984).
4. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Doherty v. Rutgers School of Law - Newark, 651
F.2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1981); Henson v. Univ. of Ark., 519 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1975); Geier v.
Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976); Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C.,
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Now, another type of challenge has arisen, one with a slightly
different twist. In a case recently considered and remanded by the
Fourth Circuit, an Hispanic student is challenging the constitutionality and overall validity of a University of Maryland scholarship program which is only available to black students." It seems that while
being an Hispanic clearly qualifies the student as a "minority student", he is not the right kind of "minority" and thus is ineligible to
receive any benefits under the program.
This Comment first traces the background of educational discrimination in the United States as it has evolved from the doctrine
of "separate but equal" 6 to the debatably equal situation that exists
today. It then focuses on minority-preference admissions programs,
their basic goals and justifications, and the various challenges that
have been raised to them in the past several years. The discussion
then shifts to minority-based scholarship programs and their overall
validity, followed by an overview of single minority or restricted
scholarships. The viability, as well as the desirability, of educational
assistance to one minority while excluding another in light of past as
well as future circumstances is explored at the end of the Comment.
II.

Background and History of Educational Discrimination

There has been discrimination in practices in the United States
since this country began.' Minorities, and most prominently blacks,
have been subjected to educational practices far inferior to those for
whites. 8 This changed, at least officially, with the "separate but

equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.9 However, no advances toward real, constitutional equality were made until 1954 when the
Supreme Court decided perhaps the most important case ever argued before it, Brown v. Board of Education.'0
Overruling the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Fer423 F. Supp. 1321 (D.N.C. 1976); DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 590 P.2d
486 (Colo. 1978); Trustees of the Univ. of Del. v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980).
5. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Id. at 544.
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
9. Id. While black and white students were supposedly to have equal educational facilities after this decision, in reality, black students were still subjected to far inferior conditions,
both in their physical surroundings and in their educational materials. See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW: LEGAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN THE
POST-BROWN ERA 41 (1986) (citing RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 134

(1977)).
10.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

SINGLE MINORITY SCHOLARSHIPS

guson, Brown undertook to desegregate American schools and to
provide equal educational opportunities for all students, regardless of
their race.11 Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated that "the importance of education to our democratic society
[and] the opportunity of an education where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms."1 2 Unfortunately, deciding the case and enforcing its
holdings were two very different problems. The following year the
Supreme Court had to set forth methods of implementing the initial
Brown decision in Brown H.3 Obviously, racist policies so deeply
embedded in years of tradition and history were not going to be
eradicated overnight.
Challenges to the Brown doctrine arose almost immediately. In
Pennsylvania, two black orphans challenged the admissions policies
of a private Philadelphia college, in what is commonly referred to as
The Girard College Case." In that case, Stephen Girard left a fund
to the City of Philadelphia in trust to operate a college, providing for
the admission of "as many poor, white, male orphans, between the
ages of six and ten years, as the said income shall be adequate to
maintain." 15 The black students were denied admission and brought
an action against Girard College. The United States Supreme Court
held that the board operating the college was a state agency and
therefore obligated to admit the black students in accordance with
the Brown decision and the principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment."
In the context of lower education, some school districts simply
11. Any other result would have been a denial of due process rights to black students
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 483.
12. Id. at 495; See also SALOMONE, supra note 9. Separate educational facilities were
realized to be inherently unequal, despite supposedly equal physical facilities, etc. Id. at 76.
13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In this case the Court,
somewhat ironically, placed the actual implementation of the desegregation remedy in the
hands of the initial defendants. Id. at 299. School Boards were ordered to individually decide
upon and design. methods of gradually introducing desegregated schools in a way that would
lead to full compliance with the original Brown decision within a reasonable time. Id. The
initial reaction to the first Brown v. Board of Education decision demonstrated that forcing
immediate compliance without the willing cooperation of school boards only served to cause
greater strife.
14. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (The Girard
College Case).
15. Id. at 231.
16. Id. In this surprisingly short two-page per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court overruled the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and disallowed the all-white admissions restriction as a form of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, despite
the fiduciary duty of the board of directors to remain faithful to the actual will provisions. Id.
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refused to comply with the mandates set forth in Brown.17 In one
Illinois case, the school district instituted a plan whereby the numbers of blacks and whites attending the school in question were equal
but where the two groups were completely segregated within the
school. 18 Blacks attended classes in one part of the building, whites
in another; blacks used one set of entrances and exits, whites another. 9 The Supreme Court reversed an initial dismissal of the complaint by the Illinois Supreme Court, forcing the Illinois court to
address the issue and eliminate the segregation. 20
A Tennessee school board formulated a desegregation plan
where any student who did not like the new, desegregated school to
which the student was assigned could transfer back to the segregated
school.2 1 This desegregation plan, too, was held to be invalid "as providing racial factors as valid conditions to support transfers which by
design and operation would perpetuate racial segregation." 2 2 All previous decisions made in reliance upon the case were reversed.2 3
The process of desegregation in public schools was a slow one.24
The Supreme Court had many occasions in the following years to
again step in and reformulate integration policies to achieve the
goals of the first Brown case. 5
In the early 1970's, desegregation took on a whole new look in
the form of busing students out of their single race neighborhood
schools to schools farther away in order to create diversity. 26 The
17. See, e.g., McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 187, Cahokia, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Goss v. Bd.
of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
18. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 187, 373 U.S. 668, 669 (1963).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 676. The District Court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies under Illinois law, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 670. However, federal rights violations such as this one are entitled to adjudication in the federal courts. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Borders v.
Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (1957).
21. Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
22. Id. at 686.
23. Id. at 689.
24. LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS 67 (1976). See also ALBERT F. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON. JR., DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING. AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES (1957); JUSTICE AND THE SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
EDUCATION LITIGATION (Barbara Flicker, ed., 1990); SALOMONE, supra note 9; J. HARVIE

WILKINSON

II,

FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION:

1954-1978 (1979); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION (1984).
25. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs. of the City of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
26. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 132. See also, JAMES BOLNER & ROBERT SHANLEY,
BUSING: THE POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROCESS (1974).

SINGLE MINORITY SCHOLARSHIPS

Supreme Court's goals now seemed not only undesirable to many
Americans, but also inconvenient as nearby schools were bypassed
and students were transported to others far from their homes in order to create more racially diverse districts.2" For many larger school
districts, however, busing was the only way to achieve racial integration quickly and to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work now until it is28 clear that state-imposed segregation has
been completely removed."
The Supreme Court first addressed the busing issue in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.9 In that case, it upheld the district court's order restructuring attendance zones and requiring bus transportation of many students in rural areas to "effectively dismantle the dual school system." 30
Several years later the Court was faced with a different type of
1 In that case, the issue cenbusing problem in Milliken v. Bradley."
•tered on whether or not to bus students from suburban areas to desegregate inner-city schools in Detroit."2 The Court held that such a
plan was unacceptable because there was no evidence of segregation
in the suburban schools and also because those school districts were
not parties to the action before the Court."3 In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Thurgood Marshall called the Court's decision a "giant step
backwards ... . [a]fter twenty years of small, often difficult steps
toward th[e] constitutional ideal of equal justice under law." 4
Today, while most Americans would agree that the overall educational system has come a long way toward the goal of equality,
there is still much left to do before this goal is truly accomplished. 5
27. BOLNER & SHANLEY, supra note 26, at 135. Blacks and whites tended to live in
different neighborhoods or sections of towns and cities, and as such, pure geographic structuring of desegregation proposals tended only to perpetuate racial segregation in this area. Id.
Many whites who initially supported the decision of Brown v. Board of Education did not
react as favorably to the busing decisions, particularly when their own children had to travel
sometimes up to one hour each way in order to carry out the desegregation plans. See WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 231.
28. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) (citing Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)).
29. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
30. Id. at 30.
31. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
32. Id. The district court in this case held that "school district lines are simply matters
of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights." Id. at 733. Accordingly, the court ordered a multi-district, area-wide remedy, even though there was evidence of
segregation only in the Detroit City School District. This order was affirmed by the court of
appeals, but reversed by the Supreme Court as being too broad a measure. See also WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 218.
33. 418 U.S. at 749 (1974). This was a 5-4 decision.
34. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 7.
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Minority quotas in higher education admissions policies, 36 as well as
preferential treatment in scholarship consideration,37 originally
designed to remedy past discrimination and to insure racial balance,38 have instead succeeded in producing racial tension and feelings of "reverse discrimination" in the majority.3 9
The Supreme Court recently reversed a school board decision
concerning racial preference among teachers in lay-off policies.' It
held that such favoritism is in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 Other courts, however, have upheld
specialized programs aimed at eliminating discrimination and increasing minority enrollment, despite such equal protection arguments. "2 Whether it is possible to effectively eliminate racial discrimination altogether in this country's educational processes remains to
be seen. The policies now in effect, however, do not seem to be readily accomplishing this goal in an efficient and uniform manner.
III.

Minority-Preference Admissions Programs

Over the past several decades, colleges, universities and graduate schools have given preference to minority students through their
admissions policies.' 3 Minority applicants may be evaluated under
different and less demanding criteria than their non-minority counterparts." Such policies are very controversial and have spawned numerous challenges to their constitutional validity by majority students who feel they have been displaced and would have been
36. GEORGE H. JAFFIN, MINORITY QUOTAS IN LAW AND MEDICINE (1977); See also,
Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
37. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991).
38. JAFFIN, supra note 36.
39. Id. There is often a "double standard" for evaluating applicants, with the majority
having to meet higher qualifications than their minority counterparts. These programs are justified by reference to such things as "cultural bias", which is thought to be inherent in standardized testing, and "cultural discrimination", which has the effect of producing lower minority test scores. Id. at 3.
40. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The school board in this case
approved a plan for laying off teachers that required the retention of those with the most
seniority, but which provided that there could be no greater percentage of minority teachers
laid off than the current percentage of minority teachers employed at the time of the layoff. Id.
at 270. Nonminority teachers, who were laid off as a result of the plan, successfully proved
that such a policy was in violation of their constitutional rights under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 283, 284.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (program
aimed at eliminating an essentially racially dual system upheld as a way of compensating for
past discrimination).
43. Robert M. O'Neill, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context,
60 VA. L. REV.925 (1974).
44. Id.

SINGLE MINORITY SCHOLARSHIPS

granted admission in the absence of such programs."5
Preferential admissions policies are admittedly discriminatory,
but have been declared constitutional as a form of "benign discrimination," in that they benefit rather than burden particular minorities. 6 However, this is often viewed instead as "reverse discrimination" and a way of "punishing" present majority students for acts of
discrimination committed by their predecessors years ago.' Such
policies have been justified not only as a method of compensation for
past discrimination, but also as a way of insuring racial balance and
remedying minority underrepresentation. 8 Double admission evaluation standards, to a certain degree, compensate for things such as
"cultural bias" and "cultural deprivation"' 9 which are blamed for
the lower overall standardized test scores of minorities.5 0 Needless to
say, these justifications and the dual standards of admission they
have created have been repeatedly challenged.5 1 Yet, despite numerous court decisions upholding such admission standards, their constitutionality and desirability are still questionable. 2
A. A Challenge to
DeFunis v. Odegaard

Race Preference Admissions Programs:

The Supreme Court was first called upon to determine the validity of a minority-preference admissions program in DeFunis v.
Odegaard" in 1974. In that case, petitioner Marco DeFunis applied
for, and was denied, admission at the University of Washington Law
School.5 ' He challenged the school's admissions policies as racially
45. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Flanagan v.
President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976); Trustees of the Univ. of
Dela. v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980).
46. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), See also, Jennifer M. Bott, From Bakke
to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D.C. Circuit'sApproach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845 (1990); JAFFIN, supra note 36.
47. JAFFIN, supra note 36.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. JAFFIN, supra note 36. See also S.E. Philips, The Golden Rule Remedy for Disparate Impact of Standardized Testing: Progress or Regress? 63 W. EDUC. L. REP. 383 (1990);
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 17. (1974).
51. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
52. See Maryland Student Appeals Minority Scholarship Ruling, STUDENT AID NEWS,
Sept. 6, 1991, at 4.
53. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
54. Id. at 314.
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discriminatory against him, as a white male.15 The trial court agreed
with his contention and ordered the school to admit him. 6 When the
case finally rose to the United States Supreme Court on appeal, the
majority held the preferential admissions issue to be moot and therefore refused to decide it. 57 However, Justice Douglas and Justice
Brennan, dissenting from the majority decision, reached the merits
of the case in a separate opinion. 58
The dissent maintained that the consideration of race as a measure of an applicant's qualification "normally introduces a capricious
and irrelevant factor working an invidious discrimination."5 It also
stated that every application should be considered in a racially neutral way, 0 looking at individual attributes other than race as a measure of potential success.6 1 Justice Douglas interpreted the equal protection clause as "commanding the elimination of racial barriers, not
their creation." 62 Although there has been much discussion and speculation as to how the majority would have decided this constitutional
issue if its merits had been reached,6 3 no real answers were available
until three years later, with the case of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.6
B. Reaching the Merits of the Issue: Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke
Upon his retirement from the Supreme Court, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. was asked which of his opinions he considered to be the
most important. 6 Without hesitation, Justice Powell replied that it
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 319. At this point, Mr. DeFunis was in his final year at the Law School of
Washington State and had registered for his final quarter. The law school maintained that he
would be entitled to finish school and to graduate from the school regardless of the Court's
determination as to the validity of the admissions policies. 416 U.S. at 316. The Court held
that mootness did not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions policies,
but rather upon the simple fact that this particular student would be allowed to finish regardless of the admissions program's validity. 416 U.S. at 319. Accordingly, the majority declined
to address the actual constitutional issue raised. Id.
58. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320-348 (1970).
59. Id. at 333. See also, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
60. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 334 (1974).
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id. at 342. Justice Douglas continued by saying that the university's purpose should
not be to produce black lawyers for blacks, Jewish lawyers for Jews, etc. It should instead be
to "produce good lawyers for Americans and not to place First Amendment barriers against
anyone." Id.
63. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 50.
64. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
65.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ.

BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME
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was the Bakke decision, a case that aroused "more interest in the
Nation, the Press and the Bar" than any other he had seen during
his time on the Court."6
Bakke presented another challenge to the constitutionality of
minority-preference admissions programs.6 7 However, because Mr.
Bakke had not yet been admitted to the school in accordance with
the order of the lower court, when the case rose to the Supreme
Court level the issue was now ripe for decision.6" Bakke was a white
male whose application for admission to the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis was denied despite a grade point
average, MCAT scores, and overall "benchmark"6 9 scores significantly higher than many of the other students accepted, both minori70
ties and whites.
Bakke challenged the legality of the school's admissions program, which reserved sixteen out of one hundred spots in the incoming class for minority students. 71 The trial court had determined that
this program constituted a racial quota system because the minority
applicants were rated only against each other, not against majority
students applying. 72 That court also held that the school could not
take race into consideration in its admissions programs, but denied
admission to Mr. Bakke, concluding that he did not prove he would
have been admitted if the special admissions program did not exist. 73
The Supreme Court of California then applied a strict-scrutiny test
and held that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 4 Because the school could not prove
that Bakke would not have been admitted in the absence of the special program, that court ordered his admission.
COURT (1988).
66. Id. at 1.
67. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
68. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Bakke v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976).
69. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978). The "benchmark"
score was a combination of scores given by the potential student's faculty interviewers, his or
her overall grade point average, his or her Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) scores,
letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 275.
72. Id. at 280.
73. Id. For further discussion of the requirement of standing when raising a challenge to
minority-preference scholarship or admissions programs see Henson v. Univ. of Ark., 519 F.2d
578 (8th Cir. 1975); Doherty v. Rutgers School of Law - Newark, 651 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.
1981); Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976); DiLeo
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 590 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1978).
74. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1978).
75. Id. at 281.
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The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

6

The Supreme Court did not directly consider the question of Bakke's7
right to bring this action under Title V1 of the Civil Rights Act,

but instead focused its opinion on whether or not the program was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.7 8 Mr. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court, stating that racial and ethnic
classifications of any sort are inherently suspect and demand "the
most exacting judicial examination. 17 9 The program at the Davis
Medical School was held not to have used the least intrusive means

of achieving valid diversification goals and was therefore in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause. 80 Bakke was granted admission to
the school. 8 1
This decision created a great deal of controversy, with neither
side really sure of who had "won," 82 notwithstanding Alan Bakke's
personal victory. The Court's decision was referred to as a "Solomonic Compromise" that did not really resolve the issue at hand. 83

The quota program reserving a specified number of seats for minorities had been struck down, yet the use of race as a 'plus' in a particular student's favor was still permissible.84 The outpouring of schol85
arly opinions and interpretations of the case was quite remarkable,
76. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed respondent Bakke's admission to the
medical school and invalidated the school's special admissions program. Id. However, at the
same time, the Court declined to prohibit petitioner from taking race into account in future
admissions decisions. Id. at 320.
77. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 283 (1978). Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in federally funded programs on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (a)(1964). Justice Stevens,
writing in a separate opinion in the Bakke decision, explores the meaning of the case in the
context of Title VI. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U-S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens,
J. dissenting).
78. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978).
79. Id. at 291.
80. Id. at 318.
81. Id. at 320.
82. SCHWARTZ, supra note 65.
83. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 298 (citing Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose, TIME MAGAZINE, July 10, 1978, at 8.) See also, SCHWARTZ supra note 65.
84. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 298.
85. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Bakke as a Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATHOLIC U. L. REY.
427, (1979); Kent D. Lollis, The Right to Education: University of California v. Bakke, 6
BLACK L. J. 265 (1980); Arval A. Morris, Bakke Decision: One Holding or Two?, 58 ORE. L.
REV. 311 (1979); William E. Sedlacek, Aftermath of Bakke: Should We Use Race in Admissions? 22 How. L. J. 327 (1979); R. Jean Simms-Brown, After Caution Comes Red: The
Bakke Decision and It's Threat to Black Educational Institutions, 5 So. U. L. REV. 211
(1979); Julius Stone, Equal Protection in Special Admissions Programs: Forward From
Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719 (1979); J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Three Views of Equal
Protection: A Backdrop to Bakke, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 25 (1979); David M. White, Pride,
Prejudiceand Prediction.From Brown to Bakke and Beyond, 22 How. L. J. 375 (1979); L.H.
LaRue, Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke, (James B. White: A Comment. Jan Deutsch, A Re-
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and it would take a long time for the dust to actually settle.
Professor Archibald Cox, who argued the Bakke case on the
side of the university,8 6 drew three basic conclusions as to the significance of the decision.87 Specifically, he interpreted the holding as
meaning that: 1) No fixed number of spaces can be held in a class
for minority students absent special circumstances or an admission
of past discrimination; 2) Simply changing a minority objective from
a "quota" to a "goal" will not prevent the program from being challenged; and 3) Special committees for minority candidates will not
be permissible unless comparisons can be made between minority
and majority candidates.8 8 Cox also found that in order to meet constitutional requirements, admissions programs must compare all students and attempt to achieve diversity by giving some preference to
minorities without instituting fixed minority quotas. 9 This however,
is only one scholar's view of the significance of a very complicated
case;'* different interpretations continue to arise and just how much
continuing influence Bakke will have in the future remains to be
91

seen .

IV.

Minority Based Scholarships

Charitable donations to institutions of higher learning are often
made in the form of scholarships. 2 Many scholarship donors, for
whatever purpose, choose to place restrictions on exactly what type
of student will receive their donated funds. 9 3 If such restrictions are
racially-based, the Fourteenth Amendment is necessarily implicated. 4 Such restrictive scholarship programs, while perhaps as wide
sponse), 38 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 43, (1981); Adolphus L. Williams, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the Bakke Case, 6 S. U. L. REV. 41 (1979).
86. 438 U.S. at 268.
87. ARCHIBALD Cox. BAKKE, WEBER, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, A ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, July 12-13 1979, at x.
88. Id.
89. Id. at xi.
90. Id. at x; See also, Archibald Cox, Minority Admissions after Bakke, in BAKKE,
WEBER, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, July 12-13,
1979.
91. WILKINSON, supra note 24, at 306.
92. A scholarship trust is considered to be charitable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 368 (1959); Howard Savings Institution of Newark v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (N.J.
1961).
93. Corbet F. Bryant, Jr., Restricted Scholarships, State Universities and the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 VA. L. REV. 1454 (1970).
94. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1972); Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967); In re
Estate of Kathryn Frey Dickerson, 474 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983). If a trust is
shown to be purely private, however, the Fourteenth Amendment may not be applicable. See

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

spread, have not received the attention, or faced the challenges that
minority-based admissions programs have.9 5 Courts that have dealt
with such scholarship restrictions in the past have interpreted them
and determined their validity in various ways. 96
Rather than invalidating scholarships and trusts with racially
restrictive clauses, many courts have instead chosen to employ the
doctrine of cy pres.97 This doctrine allows reformation of the scholarship clause to make it nondiscriminatory, and thus constitutional, if
such reformation can be achieved while still effectuating the donor's
intent.98 If the trust cannot be reformed, officials of public schools,
and perhaps of private schools as well, are prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause from administering it in a racially discriminatory
manner. 9 The United States Supreme Court, in the above mentioned Girard College Case,10 0 held that a college trust established
for white male orphans and administered by The Philadelphia Board
of Directors, a government entity, was violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10 1 Two black male orphans, who met all of theother
criteria set forth in the trust, were granted admission to the college
10 2
because the administration of the trust was through state action.
The Supreme Court did not establish a test or formulate any standards under which racially-selective trusts would be enforceable; it
In Re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970).
95. O'Neill, supra note 43, at 926. The author feels that this difference is largely related
to the student's perception of injury. "If a white believes that he would have been admitted
had there been no racial preference, his perception of injury is far clearer than that of the
student who, once admitted, thinks he might have received a bigger scholarship absent racial
preferences." Id. at 926. Regardless of the truth of this statement in the past, it is now minority scholarship programs which are coming under fire in the courts. See, e.g., Podberesky v.
Kirwan 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991).
96. See, e.g., Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C.
1976); Trustees of the Univ. of Del. v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980).
97. Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.
1972); Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967); Bank of Del. v.
Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch., 1969); Trammell v. Elliott, 199 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1973);
Howard Savings Institution of Newark v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1961); In re Estate of
Kathryn Frey Dickerson, 474 A.2d 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983); Coffee v. William
Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also, Nelkin, Cy Pres and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A DiscriminatoryLook at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEO. L.J. 272 (1967-68); Richard W. Power, The Racially Discriminatory
Charitable Trust: A Suggested Treatment, 9 ST. Louis U. L. J. 478 (1965).
98. If, however, the racially restrictive clause is determined to have been an actual, preliminary condition to the receipt of the scholarship money, cy pres cannot be applied. See
Moore v. City of Denver, 292 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1956); In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del.
Ch. 1970).
99. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Wachovia
Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972).
100. Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
101. Id. at 231.
102. Id.
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simply held that the refusal to admit the students was discrimination
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 0 s under the rule of
Brown v. Board of Education."" •
Today, racially restrictive scholarship programs are evaluated
under a two-prong test for affirmative action plans set down by the
Supreme Court in 1989 in the case City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.'" 5 In that case, which involved an employment situation, 106 the
Court held that such plans must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and also that they must be narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination.1 07 In formulating such a strict
scrutiny test for programs that discriminate on the basis of race, the
Court is seemingly moving toward a goal of long term racial
neutrality.
Applying the two-prong Croson test to single race scholarships
is not a simple matter. Our government clearly has an interest in
bringing minorities, who would not otherwise have an opportunity to
be there, onto college campuses and in offering them a chance for
greater education through minority scholarship programs. 0 s Minorities may thus be drawn into jobs, professions and social spheres from
103. Id.
104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., (Brown II) 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
105. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Bakke decision, as reported by Justice Powell, was a 5-4
opinion and not all parts of the opinion were adopted by the majority. Accordingly, no reliable
standards for determining the constitutional validity of affirmative action programs were formulated until Croson.
106. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Croson case involved a "set-aside" program in the city of
Richmond whereby prime contractors who were awarded city construction contracts had to
subcontract at least thirty percent of the work to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises".
Id. at 477. This policy was challenged by majority subcontractors and was held to be unconstitutional because it denied "certain citizens the opportunity to compete for this percentage of
work solely because of their race". Id. at 493.
107. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989). See also Sofia Androgue, When Injustice is the Game,
What is Fair Play?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 363 (1991); Margaret E. Dean, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.: A Federal Legislative Answer, 100 YALE L.J. 451 (1990); Martin J. Katz,
The Economics of Discrimination:The Three Falacies of Croson, 100 YALE L.J. 1033 (1991);
Charles M. Oellermann, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection and Affirmative Action in Local Government Contracting - City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 12 HARV. J. L. & PuB.
POL'Y 1069 (1989); Rodolpho Sandoval, An Analysis of the New Legal Model for Establishing Set-Aside Programsfor Minority Business Enterprise: The Case of City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 25 GONZ. L. REV. 141 (1989-1990); Douglas D. Scherer, Affirmative Action
Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages of Croson, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 281 (1990).
108. Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars Statement on Affirmative Action after
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989). This statement, issued by a
group of professors of constitutional law, urges that the effects of Croson should not be allowed
to effect the area of education. Id. "The American public has concluded time and again that
serious remedial efforts sometimes require race-conscious programs designed to incorporate
members of minority groups into areas from which they have too often been excluded." Id. at
1711.
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which they have systematically been excluded in the past,1" 9 and
may also be afforded certain constitutional and civil rights which
have been denied them in the past. 1 ' However, is such an interest
compelling when it favors one group, or even one minority, over another solely because of race? Should one student be denied an opportunity available to another student simply because he or she is white
or ,black or Hispanic? A goal of racial neutrality has been called
"superficial"' in light of past circumstances, but is racial neutrality
really unrealistic in today's society?
Scholarship programs that favor one race over another must
also be "narrowly tailored" for the purpose of rectifying past racial
discrimination."' It is basically undisputed that all minorities,
blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and women, to name a few, have suffered
discrimination."' Some studies show that minorities are even discriminated against in the standardized testing procedures used for
higher education admissions," 4 because a certain amount of "cultural bias" is built into such tests."' However, this justification for
offering single-race scholarships may also be questioned in light of
the higher education situation today. At many schools, there is no
evidence of official discrimination against minority students." 6 At
other schools, any discrimination that can be found took place in the
past. When is it time to say that past damages have been rectified
and it is now time to progress to a new system where everyone is
equal in the eyes of the school?
A.

A Challenge to Minority Scholarships: Podberesky v. Kirwan

Against this uncertain backdrop, a new type of controversy has
arisen. A challenge to a minority scholarship program has been
brought, not by a member of the white majority, but by another minority student, denied scholarship benefits because he is not a member of the minority group intended to benefit by the scholarship.
Daniel Podberesky, an Hispanic student at the University of Maryland, was denied 'a Banneker Scholarship because he was not
109. See JAFFIN, supra note 36.
110. Joint Statement, supra note 108.
111. Joint Statement, supra note 108.
112. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
113. O'Neill, supra note 43; See also Geier. v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp. 1263. (M.D.
Tenn. 1984).
114. See JAFFIN, supra note 36.
115. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 375-376 (D. Md. 1991).
116. Id. at 372.

SINGLE MINORITY SCHOLARSHIPS

black.11
The Banneker Scholarship program at the University of Maryland provides full, state-funded financial support for all four years of
undergraduate study for qualified black students. 18 It originated as
part of a plan formulated by the University in 1969 when its system
of higher education was found to be in violation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964119 by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of the State of Maryland. 120 When these violations were found to exist, the university
submitted five different plans to rectify the situation before one was
found to be acceptable. 1 ' The instituted plan, which was to be in
effect until June 1990, emphasized the need for "other race grants",
a term used for scholarships aimed at increasing the number of "historically underrepresented groups" in Maryland's public
universities. 2
In addition to complete educational financing, Banneker Scholarships also provide other benefits. Recipients are admitted to the
Honors Program at the University of Maryland, participate in a
Scholars Preceptorship Program, and are included in the President's
Colloquium.12 3 The scholarships are awarded to black students on a
merit basis, with minimum eligibility requirements set at a 900 SAT
score and a 3.0 high school grade point average. 24
This is where the controversy arises. Daniel Podberesky, as an
Hispanic, is clearly a member of a group whose interests Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect.'2 5 By the same
token, he is also a member of an "historically underrepresented
group" on the University of Maryland campus,1 2 and thus a prime
candidate for its "other race grants. 127 In addition, Podberesky
117. Id. at 366.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 367; 42 U.S.CA. § 2000 (a) (West 1981) provides that "all persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages
and accomodations of any place of public accomodation, [including public schools] without
discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion or national origin." Id.
120. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D. Md. 1991).
121. Id. at 367.
122. Id.
123.. Id. at 366.
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d) (1981). This section specifically provides that "no person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
126. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 367 (D. Md. 1991).
127. Id.

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

scored 1340 on the SAT test and maintained an unweighted high
school grade point average of 3.56, much higher statistics than those
necessary for receipt of a Banneker Scholarship.12 8 Daniel Podberesky, who is otherwise almost overqualified for the program, could
not be considered for a Banneker Scholarship for one reason and one
reason only: his race.129
The suit was brought in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.1 30 That court determined that Podberesky did
have standing to challenge the program because the "denial of an
equal opportunity for consideration for a benefit or privilege can give
rise to an injury conferring standing."' 3 1 The court then determined
that if the program was found to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, the appropriate remedy would be to enjoin its existence rather
than grant compensatory equitable relief to Podberesky. 32 It then
turned to the merits of the claim.
Because it is part of an affirmative action plan, the Banneker
Scholarship Program must be evaluated under the two-prong, strict
scrutiny test set down in Croson.' 3" The court first considered
whether or not the program served a compelling governmental interest with its goal of remedying the effects of past discrimination. 3 4 It
analyzed historical evidence, administrative findings, protracted litigation and the documentation of the continuing review of the Office
of Civil Rights to determine that there was undoubtedly a long history of discrimination at the school. 3 " Podberesky argued that while
such findings may have justified the Banneker program in the past,
there is no present discrimination, nor any lingering effects of past
discrimination, now on the campus. 3 Despite evidence that the university had exceeded its goal for recruiting black freshmen and had
128. Id. at 366.
129. Id. at 368.
130. Id. at 364.
131. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 367. See also Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-281 n.14 (1978); Henson v. Univ. of Ark., 519 F.2d 576 (8th
Cir., 1975); Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976); Doherty v.
Rutgers School of Law - Newark, 651 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1975); DiLeo v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Colo., 590 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1978).
132. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. at 369 (D. Md. 1991).
133. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). See also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
134. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. at 371 (D. Md. 1991).
135. Id. at 373. There is no mention in the opinion as to the exact findings of discrimination, and whether it was found to have affected just blacks or blacks, Hispanics, and other
minorities as well. Regardless, the Banneker Scholarship Program, instituted as a remedy to
the problem of overall discrimination on the campus, provides benefits to blacks only. Id.
136. Id. at 374.
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not discriminated in admissions or financial aid practices for many
years, the court found that it would be premature to say that there
were no present effects of past discrimination on the campus.""a Accordingly, it found the governmental interest compelling in this

case. 138
Next, the court considered whether the program was "narrowly
tailored" to meet the goal of remedying past discrimination. 1"9 The
university presented evidence to the effect that no other type of
scholarship program could meet the goal, 4" and that the program
was necessary for the continued recruitment of black students. 4 '
The court found that this prong was also satisfied; the Banneker
Scholarship Program, in its' opinion, "does not wreak substantial
hardship on any individual, 1"

2

except,

it would seem, Daniel

Podberesky.
Podberesky then appealed the district court's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 43 The Court
of Appeals found that the trial court had correctly examined the
scholarship program in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and had correctly subjected it to a strict
scrutiny test. 4 It also reiterated the premise that classification by
race must be justified by specific judicial, legislative or administrative findings that there are presently continuing effects of past discrimination on campus. 4 5 This court determined that no specific evidence of the continuing effects of past discrimination at the
University of Maryland had been presented and remanded the case
for further consideration. 4 However, the court held that summary
judgment for Podberesky would be appropriate if no further evidence
could be presented." 7 The final outcome from the remand has not
yet been determined.
137. Id. at 375.
138. Podberesky, 764 F. Supp. at 375.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 375-376. The court found that a merit-based scholarship program which took
race into account, as opposed to requiring applicants to be black, "would be ineffective at
serving blacks unless the racial preference were so strong as to be virtually indistinguishable
from the Banneker Program." Id. at 376. Again, there is no mention of the need to serve the
needs of Hispanics or other minority groups.
141. Id. at 375.
142. 764 F. Supp. at 376.
143. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
144. Id. at 55.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 57.
147. Id.
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Validity of Single-Minority Scholarships

It seems ironic that a program designed to help minorities
achieve educational goals and to make up for past discrimination is
ultimately the same program that will turn its back on another minority in need of the same type of help. In a situation like this, where
public funds are involved, 1 48 equal protection demands equal treatment: if not for all people, then, certainly, at least for all minorities.
Hispanics fit just as easily into the definition of a minority as
blacks, 14 9 and it would seem to follow that they are equally entitled
to state scholarship funds set aside for minority groups. While perhaps the plight of the Hispanic in the desegregation process of this
country's schools' was overshadowed by that of the black,' it was
still very much a reality.' 52 It could even be said that Hispanics have
had to carry an even larger burden, in the form of a language barrier, 5 ' that may have further increased discrimination against them.
Hispanics, as well as blacks, have been subjected to "cultural deprivation", and thus the "cultural bias" inherent in higher education
admissions testing' 51 affects them as well. This barrier would only be
compounded by an Hispanic's inability to understand, read or write
55
English.
Nearly every possible index used to measure the well-being and
life quality of American people places Hispanics at the bottom of the
list. 5 ' They are the least educated, lowest paid group in this coun148.
149.

764 F. Supp. at 376.
TONY

BAEZ ET AL.. DESEGREGATION

AND HISPANIC STUDENTS:

A COMMUNITY

This case study of the desegregation process in Milwaukee's public
school system and the role of the Hispanic Community in that process points out the discrimination Hispanics have encountered in this country for many years. Id. at 1. It particularly
emphasizes the educational process and points out many parallels between the experiences of
Hispanic Americans and black Americans in that area. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 5.
151. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
152. BAEZ, supra note 149, at 6.
153. SALOMONE, supra note 9, at 87. Hispanic students commonly have low achievement
scores, high drop-out rates, poor self-image and low family incomes as a result of language
barriers and thus the lack of understanding in the public schools and in nearly all aspects of
the educational process. Id. The government finally began to realize this in the late 1960's and
began to spend small amounts of federal education dollars on Hispanic students. Id. at 87. In
1968, ESEA Title VII, more commonly known as The Bilingual Education Act, was passed.
The objectives of the law and its prescribed methodology were very ambiguous, however, and
even after numerous amendments its actual goals and achievements are unclear. Id. at 89.
154. JAFFIN, supra note 36, at 21.
155. Cruz Reynoso et al., The Law and the Law Schools, 2 U. TOL. L. REV. 809 (1970).
156. Id. at 814.
PERSPECTIVE (1983).
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try, and they live in the poorest conditions. 15 7 The only realistic way
to improve-their situation is through education, and because they are
so often ignored in this context,15 8 the socioeconomic future of Hispanics is uncertain at best.
Without delving too deeply into the socio-economic situation of
American Hispanics today, it is sufficient to say that they have also
been a disadvantaged group in the past and have suffered much in
the same way that blacks have. If the goal of affirmative action plans
and minority scholarship programs is to remedy past discrimination
and to bring minority diversity to colleges and universities, 59 then it
should apply equally to all groups who have suffered discrimination
in the past and who have traditionally been underrepresented in
higher education. To hold otherwise would be to continue exactly
that which affirmative action was designed to eradicate: the advancement of one specific group at the expense of another.
It would seem that the best answer, however, according to today's standards, would be to eliminate race qualifications altogether,
and to administer scholarships and government funds to qualified
students rather than to qualified blacks, qualified whites or qualified
Hispanics. After many years of preferential admissions policies and
minority scholarship programs, it is unlikely that many vestiges of
past policy discrimination remain on today's campuses.18 0 Discrimination may have been a problem in the area of education admissions
or subsidies for the grandparents, or perhaps even the parents, of
today's students, but it is unlikely to have personally affected them.
This was apparently the conclusion reached by the Education
Department last December when it announced that it would withhold federal funds from any school that awarded race-based scholarships."' Even more controversy erupted when the department declared that college scholarships awarded solely on the basis of race
157. Id.
158. Id. at 832. Hispanics were not even included as a separate ethnic group in older
Census polls, and accordingly, had no money allocated specifically to them through various
governmental agencies and programs. Id. at 812. This symposium also pointed out that when
Hispanics are considered for scholarship funds under programs like the CLEO program or The
Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship Program, they must compete with other minorities, including blacks. Reynoso, supra note 155, at 832. As their numbers have traditionally been smaller
than those of the black community, they have seldom been awarded this scholarship money.

Id.

159. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
160. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 375 (D. Md. 1991).
161. Ken Myers, Conservative Groups Sets Sights On Scholarships for Minorities, THE
NAT'L L.J., April 15, 1991, at 32.

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER 1993

automatically violate civil rights law.16 2 After considerable pressure
from civil rights groups, the department backed down and held that
certain private contributions could be earmarked for minority
groups.16 3 However, the statement did seem to outline the shape of
things to come. The ideal of a race-neutral society, at least in the
64
area of education, may be hovering just over the horizon.1

V. Conclusion
Podberesky v. Kirwan'65 is just another case in a long line of
cases involving race discrimination in education, and yet it is very
different. The Court must now decide not only the validity and viability of the two-prong Croson strict scrutiny test' 66 as applied to
affirmative action programs in general, but also as applied to affirmative action programs that discriminate against other minorities. If
remnants of past discrimination are still visible on today's campuses,
and if special programs are still necessary to ensure minorities a
place in the higher education setting, then it seems only logical that
they be applied even-handedly to all minorities. It is not only blacks,
but Hispanics as well, who have suffered the effects of race discrimination. If one minority group is entitled to special treatment under
these circumstances, common sense dictates that other minority
groups in the same situation are entitled to it as well.
Such preferential policies in both admissions and scholarship
administration have been in effect for many years, however, and it is
possible that their purpose has been served. Discrimination in these
162. Maryland Student Appeals Minority Scholarship Ruling, STUDENT AID NEws,
Sept. 6, 1991, at 4.
163. Myers, supra note 161, at 32. These statements stemmed from a controversy at
UCLA Law School involving a majority student. This student, Daniel Young, was awarded a
Graduate Assistance Program scholarship worth $316. Id. However, when a school official
looked up Young's record for another matter, he noticed the Graduate Assistance Program
(GAP) grant and told Young that it never should have been granted to him, because these
grants are specifically reserved for minority students. Id. Young's grant was simply deleted
from the computer. Young stated that he had "always thought that race should be irrelevant,
and I guess it isn't at UCLA." Id. The matter is now being pursued by the Washington Legal
Foundation, a Washington, D.C. based public-interest firm. Id.
164. President Bush signed the 1991 Civil Rights Act into law amid controversy that its
true effect was to put an end to all affirmative action programs in Federal Government hiring.
Bush denied these allegations, but some of his critics feel that this is the true gist of the Act.
See Andrew Rosenthal, President Tries to Quell Furor on Interpreting Scope of New Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al. See also Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Action Plans Are
Part of Business Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at A20. This article reveals the results of a
N.Y. Times - CBS poll which shows that the general public does not support hiring programs
that give preference to racial minorities.
165. 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991).
166. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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areas is a thing of the past, and continued special treatment of minorities, rather than fostering goodwill, is creating tension and strife
on many campuses.16 It is time to take a hard look at affirmative
action policies, to determine their purpose in the educational setting
of today, and to decide if their effects, in many cases, may be detrimental. Podberesky v. Kirwan may provide the vehicle for the Supreme Court to make just such a determination.
Andrea L. Bistline

167.

Ken Myers, Applicant's Reverse Bias Suit in New York Allowed to Proceed, THE

NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1991 at 44. Several law schools, including Georgetown and Touro in New

York, have had experiences recently where minority grades and test scores have been published or posted on student bulletin boards in attempts to show the disparity between acceptable levels of admissions and performance standards for minority versus majority students. See
Ken Myers, Touro is Latest to be Hit by Trend of Revealing Minority Grades, THE NAT'L
L.J., June 17, 1991, at 41.

